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Abstract
The paper considers the democratic value of the recent public
sphere movements—from Occupy Wall Street to Taksim Gezi
Park, from Tahrir Square to Sofia. It argues that the mainstream
models of democracy fail to grasp the significance of these
movements and the emergent political forms within these move-
ments due to their narrow account of politics and democracy. To
fully grasp the democratic value of recent public sphere move-
ments, we should approach them from an agonistic perspective.
Once democratic politics is viewed from an agonistic perspec-
tive, it becomes possible to recognize that while expressing their
critique of existing liberal democratic institutions, the recent
public sphere movements contested the dominant understanding
of democracy and staged an alternative vision of democracy, de-
mocratic culture, and new forms of citizenship.
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INTRODUCTION
W hat was the democratic value of the recent public sphere move-ments—from Occupy Wall Street to Taksim Gezi Park, from Tahrir
26
Square to Sofia? Was there any constructive legacy, or were the protestors in each
engaged in a futile as well as pointless exercise? To fully grasp the democra-
tic value of the recent public sphere movements, we should approach them from
an agonistic perspective. Once democratic politics is viewed from an agonistic
perspective, it becomes possible to recognize that while expressing their critique
of existing liberal democratic institutions, the recent public sphere movements
contested the dominant understanding of democracy and staged an alternative vi-
sion of democracy, democratic culture, and new forms of citizenship. Mainstream
models of democracy therefore fail to grasp the significance of these movements
and the emergent political forms within these movements, because their accounts
of politics and democracy tend to be too limited in scope.
The recent protest movements—from Occupy Wall Street in the United States
to “Dance with Me” in Bulgaria, from Gezi Park in Turkey to Tahrir Square in
Egypt—challenged the dominant understanding of democracy and sought a re-
definition of the concept by reintroducing public spaces, active citizenship, and
democratic engagement. Occupying the streets, the squares, and the public parks,
the people brought to our attention the global crisis of representative democracy.
The protesters expressed their democratic demands and requested a more partici-
patory democracy. The protesters’ call for linking the political public space with
the political system has been ignored by their governments. Perceiving the idea of
bringing the public back into democracy as a problem, the political and economic
elite characterized the protesters as looters, fringe extremists, marauders, and en-
emies of democracy.i The dominant political discourses that promote ballot-box
democracy marginalized the protests while the police immediately took action to
contain and discipline the protestors.
Appreciating the significance of the recent public sphere movements for
democracy allows us to recognize the democratic value of the emergent political
forms within these movements. In what ways do the recent public sphere move-
ments contribute to existing democratic ideas? How should we understand the
democratic value of the new repertoire of political performances staged in
recent protests? I suggest that the mainstream approaches to democ-
racy—Schumpeterian leadership democracy and Habermasian deliberative
democracy—fail to recognize the democratic value of protests that have oc-
curred all over the world. Overly occupied with various dimensions of in-
stitutional politics such as democratic procedures, rationality and legitimacy,
self-interest and party politics, these models of democracy rest on an under-
standing of politics that is too limited in scope to recognize the significance of
disruptive and expressive political actions and political performances in public
spaces. The failure to understand the democratic value of the recent movement
therefore contributes to their marginalization.
To grasp the democratic value of the recent public sphere movements and the
emergent protest forms within these movements, we should approach them from
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an agonistic democratic perspective. Once democratic politics is viewed from
an agonistic perspective, it becomes possible to recognize that the recent public
sphere movements and the emergent political practices are essential to a vibrant
political democracy. In recent political movements, in addition to making their
political claims, the protesters invented new forms of citizenship and fostered an
alternative ethos of democracy centering on equality, civility, and plurality. Con-
testing common sense, developing a language of resistance, and performing an
alternative vision of democracy are the most important contributions of the recent
public sphere movements to democracy.
RECENT PUBLIC SPHERE MOVEMENTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
NEW FORMS OF POLITICS
A wave of demonstrations and mass protests started in Iceland and Greece in
2009. It then spread to Tunisia and Egypt and triggered a cycle of protests in
North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. Simultaneously, mass protests erupted
across the US and Spain. When the wave of protests seemed to come to an end,
protests in Turkey erupted in May 2013. While the world was closely watch-
ing the unexpected protests across Turkey, in June 2013 mass demonstrations
and anti-government protests began in Brazil and Bulgaria. Commentators dis-
agree about whether these protests should be treated as instances of a global
movement that react to a global problem or—given that each country has starkly
different dynamics—whether each protest should be seen as a response to a
specific situation, such as real estate bubbles; rising public transportation ticket
prices; corruption; authoritarian regimes; police violence against demonstrators;
and privatization of the commons.ii Despite the differences among these move-
ments, however, they share two common characteristics.
The first characteristic is that, in all public sphere movements, the protesters
challenged dominant forms of democracy and demanded a redefinition of the
concept. Surprisingly, the protests exploded at a time when the global appeal of
liberal democracy seemed to be peaking.iii It is not that democratic systems do
not enjoy wide support of the public; on the contrary, democracy is effectively
the hegemonic political regime. The issue is that the dominant form of liberal
democracy has lead to a widening of the gap between the public opinion and the
political system.
The gap between the public and the political system is an unavoidable weak-
ness of representative democracy. This is why Jean Jacques Rousseau was hostile
to the very idea of political representation. For Rousseau, representation of sov-
ereignty meant surrender of moral agency since one cannot be free when one’s
will is represented by another. The political assembly with its authority to legis-
late would be passing laws on various topics on which citizens have not agreed.
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Thus, Rousseau asserted, people are only free only on the election day; once the
members of the parliament are elected, a form of slavery overtakes democracy.iv
Rousseau recognizes the impossibility, however, of having direct democracy
in modern societies. Declining citizen interest in politics, social-economic con-
ditions that neither encourage political participation nor leave time for it, the
inherent complexity of political issues, size and population of democracies and
many other reasons could be stated to explain the necessity instead for political
representation. The inevitability of political representation thus creates a gap be-
tween the rulers and the ruled. Political theorists have devised models to respond
to this problem of power and legitimacy, but the problem Rousseau pointed out
has never been successfully addressed. The problem has only become more acute
and has now taken the form of a global legitimation crisis because of the grow-
ing gap between the public and the political elite. There is an increasing cynicism
about politics, politicians and the overall political system. People do not consider
themselves represented by the political system and they do not believe that they
have a political voice.v Protesters participating in the recent public sphere move-
ments expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing democratic mechanisms
and called for inclusion, equality, and the elimination of the gap between the pub-
lic’s opinion and interests and the political agenda.vi
The second common characteristic of recent political movements is the new
form of politics staged during demonstrations. In addition to the conventional
methods of protest, protesters occupied public spaces while using the occupied
spaces as a stage for interaction, creativity, and performance.vii Especially in
the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and Bulgaria protesters have staged a new
repertoire of political action in public squares, parks and streets that has chal-
lenged traditional methods of protest. These movements are grounded in physical
spaces, which is why their names come from the space occupied: Tahrir Square,
Gezi Park, Wall Street.viii The movements were organized horizontally with no
centralized leadership. The protesters rejected representatives and the hierarchi-
cal structure of traditional politics. The protests were accompanied by local fora
where participants could freely express their concerns and share their experi-
ences. The occupied public spaces were transformed into a collective space where
protesters experienced a kind of communal life. In both Occupy Wall Street and
Gezi Park protests, protesters created an autonomous infrastructure that involved
a free food center, a free medical center and veterinary, a vegetable garden, a per-
formance stage, free wi-fi, a playground, free lectures and a library. Protesters
shared and exchanged blankets, medicine, books, yoga mats, gas masks, and even
mobile phone chargers.ix
The language of creativity and civility was at the core of all movements. In
Tahrir Square, protestors demonstrated with books and flowers in hand, protected
the shopkeepers from looters, and swept the square clean at the end of the day.
When Coptic Christians celebrated mass, the Muslims formed a circle around
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Christians to protect them; when the Muslims prayed Christians joined hand in a
circle to protect the Muslims.x In Sofia, rallies and demonstrations had a festival-
like atmosphere. The protests in Sofia have become a part of the daily life of
tens of thousands of citizens. People gathered in large numbers after work dur-
ing weekdays and on weekends to join the protests and to socialize. Families
came with their babies and strollers, others brought their dogs, and others bikes
and flowers. Protesters staged yoga protests, signed songs, played music, and
shouted slogans with books in hand while others staged peaceful and disruptive
forms of protest.xi The creative and playful nature of the Bulgarian protests can
be understood even from its name. The acronym of the National Security Agency
in Bulgarian (DANS) is pronounced as ‘dance’ and that’s why the protesters
named the movements ‘dance with me’. Taking the motto literally, many protest-
ers danced during the protest, transforming it into a street party.xii In Taksim Gezi
Park protests, creativity and humor were present in the songs, slogans, banners,
and posters. It was a festival of satire, irony, and endless political jokes. Artistic
performances with political themes such as street theatre, stand-up comedy, con-
certs, games, and other creative political performances were part of protestors’
repertoire of political action.xiii
At a first glance the link between the two characteristics of the recent public
sphere movements seems clear. To express their anger toward their political sys-
tem and to highlight its problems, peaceful protesters occupied public spaces
and staged various performances to draw the attention of the public. But, then
how are we to understand the emergent forms of politics? What is political about
exchanging and sharing blankets, dancing in a public square, or maintaining a
vegetable garden? Are these “apolitical” practices? Do they have any democra-
tic value beyond drawing the attention of the public? To recognize the political
and democratic value of this new wave of protests, it is important to answer these
questions. In the next section, I approach these questions from the perspective
of two dominant models of democracy in order to show how the mainstream ap-
proaches fail to understand the democratic potential of the recent movements.
TWO MODELS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RECENT POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS
Joseph Schumpeter’s leadership democracy (or elite democracy) has been the
most influential model of democracy in empirical political theory and political
science since the 1940s. Habermasian deliberative democracy challenged the
dominance of the leadership model and emerged as the new paradigm in nor-
mative political theory towards the end of the 20th century. When approached
from the perspectives of these models of democracy, the recent protests are either
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undesirable in a democracy or only instrumentally valuable. I argue that both
models fail to recognize the real democratic value of the recent political protests.
POLITICAL CUSTOMERS AND THE POLITICAL ELITE
Schumpeter advanced his theory of democracy in his seminal work Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy.xiv In the section of the book on democracy, Schum-
peter first criticized what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy and then
defends his leadership model of democracy. Schumpeter argued that the flaw of
the “classical doctrine” of democracy is that it is based on the idea that there
exists a common good on which we may all agree. According to the classical
doctrine, Schumpeter wrote, the common good is easy to define and every ratio-
nal person can be made to see this common good by means of rational argument.
For Schumpeter, there is “no such thing as a uniquely determined common good
that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational ar-
gument.”xv Different individuals and groups disagree over the most fundamental
issues and the clash of ultimate values cannot be reconciled by rational argument.
Even when we agree on the ends, disagreement on the means to achieve those
ends persists.
The absence of a common good and the irreducible differences of ultimate
values mean that conflict is permanent in democratic politics. Schumpeter’s sec-
ond criticism targets the classical doctrine's fundamental normative requirement
that individual participation of each citizen in political decision-making is es-
sential. According to Schumpeter, people are neither rational nor sufficiently
informed to be able to make sound political judgments. Schumpeter noted
that “even newspaper readers, radio audiences, members of a party even if not
physically gathered together are terribly easy to work up into a psychological
crowd and into a state of frenzy in which attempt at rational argument only
spurs the animal spirits.”xvi The ordinary citizen tends to yield to irrational prej-
udice and impulse in politics. What is shocking is that even the most educated
is ignorant and lacks judgment when it comes to matters of politics. Thus,
Schumpeter concluded, “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental
performance as soon as he enters the political field.”xvii
For Schumpeter, given that people cannot be carried up the ladder of politics,
citizen participation beyond voting in elections is not desirable. Democracy is
not about deliberation or participation in the decision-making process; rather it
should be understood as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a compet-
itive struggle for people’s vote.”xviii According to this definition, democracy is the
political mechanism for competition among members of the political elite. De-
mocratic process understood as a competitive struggle among the elite for power
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and office therefore limits the role of the people to the election of those members
of the elite who will govern. The true function of the electorate’s vote, therefore,
is to produce a government and acceptance of leadership. Within this framework,
the role of citizens is reduced to periodically voting for and authorizing their gov-
ernment. Political participation beyond this is not desirable.
Seen from the perspective of leadership model of democracy, it is clear that
the recent political protests are simply undesirable. Citizens (or political con-
sumers as Schumpeter defines them) who are dissatisfied with the democratic
process and their political leaders should express their preferences at the bal-
lot box. There is no room in the elite model of democracy for disruptive political
protests. To be sure, this is not to say that citizens should not have the right to
protest. Schumpeter does not make that claim, but it is clear that the dominant
political culture in an elite model of democracy would not be hospitable to this
type of political activity. Given that the elite model is the dominant version
of democracy today, it is no surprise that the protesters are characterized in
a derogatory fashion as potential trouble-makers, self-destructive mobs, and ex-
tremists.xix At best, democratic participation in the form of disruptive political
protest can be seen as an unwelcome attempt to exert political pressure on the
political elite and influence the political agenda. However, when it comes to the
new forms of politics emerged in recent political movements, the Schumpeterian
model would be silent about their democratic value. Those disruptive and creative
performances are not only undesirable, but they also have no democratic value.xx
PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEMOCRACY
Habermasian deliberative democracy offers an alternative to the elite model of
democracy. It reclaims the radical democratic inspiration of Rousseau’s direct
democracy by reintroducing the public sphere back into democracy. The nor-
mative ideal of the public sphere forms the core of deliberative democracy.
According to Habermas, the deliberative democratic process is constituted by
the ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. In this model, through
rational discussion, the public sphere generates democratic opinion and enables
collective-will formation, which, in turn, channels the use of administrative
power in the specific directions.xxi In addition to periodic elections which provide
a formal mechanism for controlling state authority, the deliberative democratic
process serves as the basis for self-governance by providing citizens an informal
way of criticism. The institutionalization of opinion generated in the public
sphere through rational discussion allows the public to criticize and control the
political authority informally.xxii Political legitimacy is bound to opinion gen-
erated and worked out rationally and democratically in the public sphere. As
Habermas notes, the normative expectations connected with deliberative politics
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are primarily placed within that sphere. Within a democratic framework, it medi-
ates between the state and society as a vehicle of public opinion.
Habermas describes the public sphere as a network of communicative struc-
tures for sharing “information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing
affirmative or negative attitudes.”xxiii In this process, “the streams of communi-
cation are filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles
of topically specified public opinions.”xxiv Habermas then draws a distinction
between weak and strong publics. Weak publics refer to “publics whose deliber-
ative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not encompass
decision-making” whereas a strong public “encompasses both opinion forma-
tion and decision making”.xxv Drawing on this distinction Habermas describes
the weak public, which is placed at the periphery of the political system, as the
vehicle of public opinion.xxvi The function of the weak public is to signal the
problems that need to be dealt at the political system since they cannot be re-
solved elsewhere. The weak publics function as a sounding board for problems:
“a warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive through-
out society.”xxvii Besides detecting and identifying problems, weak publics must
convincingly and influentially thematize those problems. The dramatization of
political problems would enable the parliamentary bodies to consider and deal
with them. Parliamentary opinion and will-formation must be sensitive to the
informal contexts of communication embedded in the weak publics. A rational
will-formation can come out of the democratic process only if the arguments,
opinions, and issues that developed in the public sphere can permeate through
to the organized opinion-formation. The legitimating force of the democratic
process is grounded by the rational treatment of political questions. In this
process institutionalization of procedures (and the presuppositions of communi-
cation) is the guarantee for the rational acceptability of the outcomes since this
institutionalization enables the political public sphere to fulfill its functions. The
interplay between the strong publics as the medium for political will-formation
and the weak publics is the source of the normative expectation of rational and
thus legitimate democratic outcomes.xxviii
Given the centrality of the political public sphere and, in particular, weak
publics in the deliberative democratic process, one might expect that deliberative
democracy would characterize recent political protests as an indispensible part
of the democratic process. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, how-
ever, although the emergent forms of protest may supplement the democratic
process since they thematize and dramatize the gap between the public sphere
and the political agenda, the methods protesters use to express their opinions
undermine the rational character of the political discourse. Deliberative democ-
racy prioritizes attaining legitimacy through rational opinion formation which is
a process initiated within the political public sphere. And deliberative democracy
is clear on the limitations and modes of communication that should be employed
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in political public sphere.xxix From this perspective, the recent surge of creativ-
ity and performativity in political protest may be seen as instrumental attempts
to dramatize political problems. The deliberative approach may acknowledge the
instrumental value of disruptive and expressive type of contestation and expres-
sion, but, like the Schumpeterian model, it puts no democratic value on them.
At most, from the perspective of deliberative democracy, we need to put up with
disruptive, disorderly, and expressive political action. Once we approach recent
political movements from this perspective, the democratic value of the new forms
of political action has gone unnoticed. Singing in the square, reading books to
the police, sweeping the square clean at the end of the day, and other political
performances in public spaces thus become irrelevant and have no democratic
value other than transmitting issues to political institutions where discussion and
decision-making takes place.
WHY THE AGONISTIC PERSPECTIVE MATTERS
Agonistic democracy offers an alternative to the elite model of democracy and
deliberative democracy by advancing a new vision of democracy and politics. To
understand why we should approach the recent protests and the new repertoire
of political action from an agonistic perspective in order to reveal their demo-
cratic value, it is necessary to demonstrate how agonistic democracy views the
nature of politics, political action, and democracy. Seen from the perspective of
agonistic democracy, the mainstream models of democracy rely upon a concep-
tion of politics that prioritizes the political system as the most important site of
politics and view the aim of politics as the production of public policy outcomes.
That’s why the mainstream approaches to democratic politics fail to grasp the de-
mocratic meaning of the new political performances staged in recent protests and
fail to make room for such forms of political practices. Although the deliberative
democratic model with its emphasis on the public sphere values political partic-
ipation, its understanding of political action as rational deliberation oriented to
understanding does not allow it to theorize the democratic value of disruptive and
expressive political action.
Agonistic democracy takes seriously mainstream institutional politics while
endorsing a broad conception of politics that exceeds institutional limits. The
agonistic account of politics “resists the state’s organization of politics into ap-
proved spaces and formats” and “decenters the state as the owner and licenser
of politics.”xxx Agonists argue that politics is ubiquitous in contemporary life
and political sites are diffused across the surface of the social.xxxi Pluralizing
the political by extending the domain of political expression and contestation
to various sites and relations over the social allows for the recognition of the
political potential of several everyday political spaces such as the public space,
Democracy and the Square | Gursozlu
34
workplace, family, religious institutions, educational institutions, sexual rela-
tions, and economic relations.
This broad notion of politics rests on an ontology of power and an account
of the social. For agonistic democrats, every social order is purely contingent,
incomplete, and open.xxxii It follows from this that “every social order is the
result of the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices.”xxxiii
As Chantal Mouffe indicates, “all systems of social relations imply to certain ex-
tent relations of power.”xxxiv Therefore, every order is political and is an expres-
sion of a specific pattern of power relations. What follows is the impossibility of
separating off social as a completely distinct realm from the political.xxxv The so-
cial is simply the domain of sedimented political practices. A society cannot exist
without sedimented social practices, yet these sedimented practices “are taken
for granted, as if they were self-grounded” and their contingent political con-
stitution is often concealed.xxxvi These settlements, and overall the background
context, exclude, constrain or encourage certain norms, standards, and identi-
ties while inevitably determining the range of acceptable interpretations of the
terms of the political discourse (such as reasonable, legitimate, neutral, common
good, justice, fairness, right), the permissible forms of political action, and the
dominant approaches in institutional politics. For agonistic democracy, one of
the main aims of political activity is to reveal the hegemonic and contingent
nature of these seemingly apolitical elements—social patterns of representation,
deeply entrenched values, standards of judgment, and daily attitudes—that deeply
shape everyday practices. Agonistic performance by contesting the “normal” and
the “naturalized” introduces the possibility of reconstructing the terms of cultural
intelligibility and reservoir of meanings and thereby opens up the space for the
emergence of new political subjectivities, approaches, and norms.xxxvii Agonists
argue that the subject of politics exceeds the laws of the state and public poli-
cies and extends to the reservoir of norms, values, meanings, assumptions, and
identities that constitute the political order. Political activity takes place wher-
ever a particular hegemony is constructed or unsettled.xxxviii A democratic politics
that only focuses on issues of institutional politics would inevitably neglect these
more fundamental questions of politics about the background context.
For agonists, democracy provides the stage for this unending and dynamic
struggle among contending identities and hegemonic projects over visions,
boundaries, public standards and norms governing the political order. Agonistic
democracy shifts our attention away from institutional structures to politics of
everyday life. Democracy is viewed as a process that needs to be regenerated by
agonistic performance. That is why, for agonistic democrats, conflict in social
and political life is not a sign of imperfection, but an expression of a healthy
democratic life. What is at stake is the perpetuation of the public space—the
agon—as the medium of contestation, enactment, and performance. The public
and everyday spaces become important political sites where political actors stake
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their claims, contest the hegemonic elements of the social, and express
the unimagined and unrecognized possibilities. This understanding of democracy
and political action places civil society at the center of democratic politics. Public
spaces become usual spaces for unsettling the dominant hegemony, staging al-
ternative possibilities, and expressing freedom. Within this framework, agonistic
political performance has democratic value beyond the possible effects it has on
the political agenda and political decision-making.
RECOGNIZING THE DEMOCRATIC VALUE OF THE RECENT PUBLIC
SPHERE MOVEMENTS
The agonistic approach to democracy and politics allows for the recognition of
the democratic value of the recent public sphere movements. From an agonistic
perspective, the protests do not only problematize the crisis of liberal democracy,
but they defend an alternative democratic regime and a broader notion of politics
that does not prioritize institutional politics. In doing so, they challenge the tra-
ditional boundaries of politics, the hegemony of the elite model of democracy,
and the existing structures of representation and political power. In addition to us-
ing conventional methods of protest, the new political movements expressed their
alternative to the existing political order by performing the kind of democracy or-
ganization they defend, by opening up political spaces for inclusion of difference
and emergence of new subjectivities, and by generating an ethos of democracy
required to support a peaceful pluralistic inclusive democracy.
The organizational structure of the Occupy Wall Street movement, Taksim
Gezi protests, and Bulgarian protests is a significant part of the protester’s po-
litical vision and their critique of existing democratic institutions.xxxix These
demonstrations are organized by ordinary citizens who argue that the existing
representative structures have failed to represent them. The point is that the politi-
cal system is occupied by the political and economic elite and political parties that
are distant from the ordinary people, along with lobbies whose goal is to maxi-
mize the interests of big business and thus refused the people a political voice.
In these political movements, the critique of the existing hierarchical political or-
ganization and representation was accompanied by an enactment of alternative
political order that challenged the hegemony of the existing form of representa-
tive democracy. The protesters rejected the hierarchical formation of the vertical
organization and organized themselves horizontally. They did not have clearly
designated leaders, representatives, and a specific set of demands. The protesters
set up assemblies in the occupied spaces and local neighborhoods that became
sites for political discussion and engagement. In these forums, every participant
could express her own views and join the political dialogue. The regulating norms
were openness, transparency, equality, and inclusion.xl The forums or platforms
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continued even after the main protests ended. Ordinary citizens organized neigh-
borhood assemblies and discussed political issues. The aim of the forums was
to keep the spaces of everyday politics open for participation and expression
and to demonstrate the possibility of a more inclusive and participatory vision
of democracy. The organizational structure of the protests created a challenge
for the traditional approaches to democratic politics. Failing to grasp that the
protesters displayed an alternative vision of democratic organization, many com-
mentators and politicians questioned the political character and efficacy of this
new form of protest.xli Once we see these new forms of politics as counter-
hegemonic struggles that challenge the dominance of one form of democracy,
however, the political nature and the democratic value of organizing the protests
horizontally become clear.xlii In staging their demands and critique in a new form,
the protesters redefined democratic politics by contesting the dominant under-
standing of liberal democracy and by staging a new order based on participation,
inclusion and equality.
To fully grasp the democratic value of the recent political protests, it is also
important to recognize the political spaces the protests opened up for inclusion
of differences. The new political movements offered opportunities for democra-
tization by providing the stage for minorities and marginalized groups to chal-
lenge the hegemonic norms while expressing themselves without worrying about
the negative consequences. For agents and social groups who seek entry in the
public realm and struggle for recognition and inclusion these safe political spaces
provide a stage for visibility and expression of their experiences. The public
sphere movements generated stages for performance, discussion, and interaction.
In these public political spaces, agents could “manifest freely their presence and
interact with each other.”xliii Exchanging stories and sharing experiences allowed
the protesters to get to know each other and forge new relationships. The interac-
tions of the protesters at occupied public spaces—sharing food, blankets, books,
medicine, and so on—should be seen from this perspective. For instance, against
the backdrop of the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the respectful and cooperative
interactions between the Christians and the Muslims in Tahrir Square take on a
deeply political and democratic meaning that is not easily recognized by tradi-
tional notions of democratic politics. In Istanbul Gezi Park protests, participants
from different ethnic, racial, sexual, religious, and political groups had the op-
portunities to have an open discussion about their political views, identities, and
preferences. For the first time, LGBT community got to know “anti-capitalist
Muslims,” Kurdish separatists expressed their desire for an independent “Kur-
distan” without being penalized or booed, and transsexuals shared their bitter
experiences.xliv The point is that the new type of worldwide protests brought “the
micropolitics of everyday life into the realm of democracy.”xlv Political per-
formances in the public opened up political spaces for the emergence of new
relationships, new forms of political subjectivities, and a new democratic space.
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Thus, these political movements generated a democratic ethos that is at the core
of a peaceful, pluralistic, and inclusive democracy.
From the perspective of agonistic democracy, the new forms of citizenship
that emerged during the protests are as valuable as the democratic ethos being
formed. By performing in the public the protesters realized that they have a voice
and recognized themselves as political actors and thus reclaimed their political
power.xlvi Unlike the militant factionalism that dominates the political landscape
today, the new political subjects that emerged in recent political movements
are open to democratic engagement. The protesters rejected politics of polar-
ization and exclusion while reminding the importance of civility and tolerance
in democratic politics. This alternative form of citizenship endorses the politi-
cal notions of civility, tolerance, and equality. Active citizens who seek a voice
in the political arena enacted these politics virtues by performing in the public.
They have used the public space as a stage “for the rehearsal of new forms of
citizenship.”xlvii Seen from this perspective, what the traditional approaches to
democratic politics characterize as “apolitical” practices become political acts as
they generate the core values of a new democratic vision. Practices of the pro-
testers in Sofia and Tahrir Square such as demonstrating with flowers in hand,
reading books to the police and offering them water, sweeping the square clean at
the end of day are examples of turning to language of civility and tolerance while
rejecting the polarizing rhetoric that characterized the protesters as a mob. Sim-
ilarly, playing music in front of police lines, dancing, and singing in the square,
doing yoga, offering free lectures, holding sarcastic banners and signs, telling po-
litical jokes, staging political theatre in public should be seen as expression of the
civil, tolerant and peaceful characteristics of these new political agents.
CONCLUSION
The recent political protests contested the widening gap between the political
system and the public sphere, and the political elite and ordinary citizens. This
is the democratic political moment most commentators emphasized. To be sure,
exerting pressure on decision-makers, influencing the political agenda, and trans-
mitting unrecognized issues and concerns to the political public sphere are es-
sential parts of a healthy democracy. The agonistic perspective advanced here
does not downplay the significance of collective decision-making and the insti-
tutional dimension of democracy. The point is that there is more to politics and
democracy than state authority and institutional politics. A democratic politics
that measures the value of political action by its effects on institutional politics
cannot recognize the democratic value of the disruptive and expressive political
performances and the emergent forms of political protests within the recent public
sphere movements. Only when we take the agonistic perspective that envisions
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democratic politics as an unending struggle over the terms, conditions, and shape
of the polity, and emphasizes the significance of understanding democracy as an
ethos, we can recognize the democratic potential of the recent political move-
ments. Once we approach the recent public sphere movements and the emergent
political forms within these movements from an agonistic perspective, it becomes
clear that while voicing a crisis of liberal democracy, these political movements
performed an alternative notion of democracy, democratic culture, and citizen-
ship in public spaces.
The recent public sphere movements expanded existing democratic imag-
inaries by unsettling the common sense and challenging the “normal” un-
derstanding of democracy and by displaying the possibility of an alternative
political organization. The aim of this type of performative, disruptive, and
creative politics is not to win an election, but to redefine democracy and to
develop a language of resistance and counter-acting by generating a democra-
tic ethos of inclusion, plurality, civility, tolerance, and respect while opening
up political spaces for the emergence of new political agents. Unlike the ap-
proaches that characterize the recent protests as “apolitical” and “meaningless,”
when approached from an agonistic perspective, what we recognize is that these
movements and the new forms of political protest they staged are essential
aspects of a vibrant participatory democracy.
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